http://onewish4u.com/entire-riverboat-community-shares-jesus-mainz-germany/riverboat-1/ The complete paper, Roadmap for a Voluntary Incentive Auction of Educational Spectrum in the 2.5 GHz Band, can be downloaded in PDF format by clicking HERE. This blog post contains the executive summary only (with footnotes omitted).
Sultānpur It has been sixty years since Ronald Coase developed his titular theorem while considering whether the allocation of spectrum resources should be determined by market forces rather than government predictions. The once novel idea of harnessing the power of competitive bidding (i.e., auctions) to allocate spectrum rights has since become the norm for assigning spectrum licenses at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and throughout the world. After years of success with auctions, the FCC has repeatedly concluded that competitive bidding is a more efficient mechanism for licensing spectrum than “any previously employed methods.” The FCC has nevertheless proposed to grant new Educational Broadband Service (EBS) licenses suitable for next-generation 5G services using “filing windows,” one of the “previously employed” methods for allocating spectrum rights that are less efficient than auctions.
This paper concludes that the FCC should instead hold a voluntary incentive auction to assign new licenses for the EBS “white spaces” and spectrum reclaimed from incumbent EBS licensees, because:
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